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3THE STRATEGIC ROLE OF THE PLANT: TESTING FERDOWS' MODEL
ABSTRACT
The literature on global manufacturing strategy is still scarce. There are few models
that help managers design and manage their global plant network. An interesting
model, however, is the one developed by Ferdows, describing the strategic role of
plants.
This paper discusses this model and tests it empirically. The data provide strong
empirical support for the model and add some new insights.
4Whether a multinational company is in search of new opportunities to manufacture
abroad, or it faces a rationalization and restructuring of its plant network, some of the
key decisions that have to be made are of the same nature. In both cases a
manufacturing strategy plan is needed which focuses on the plant configuration. This
plan should answer questions such as "How many plants should our company ideally
have?", "Where should these plants be located?", "What level of competence should
each plant have?", "Which strategic role should be attributed to each plant?", "Which
products should be produced in which plant?".
Few models are available in the manufacturing strategy literature that help managers
to find the answers to these questions. Interesting is the model developed by Kasra
Ferdows, which describes and discusses distinct strategic roles of plants. (Ferdows,
1989) However, this model lacks empirical testing beyond case research. It is the
purpose of this paper to develop an operationalization tool for this model, and to test it
empirically on a sample of plants.
LITERATURE REVIEW
International manufacturing strategy
Already in 1964 Skinner, a pioneer in the field of manufacturing strategy, warned “the
time has come when we must begin to sharpen the management of international
manufacturing operations”. (Skinner, 1964) As competition is globalizing and the
complexity of the environment in which companies operate is increasing, managing
an integrated international network has become an increasingly important task for
manufacturing managers. (Bartlett & Ghoshal, 1989; Ferdows, 1997a) Decisions need
to be taken of both structural and infrastructural nature. (Hayes & Wheelwright, 1984)
5The size and location of the plants, the capacity, the type of equipment and degree of
automation are just a few of the structural decisions that need to be taken for each of
the plants. The skill level of the workforce, the degree of autonomy of the plants, and
the organization structure of the plants are important infrastructural decisions. (Hayes
et al., 1984) However, a major challenge for multinationals is to leverage the
international configuration of manufacturing units for creating sustainable competitive
advantage. (Ferdows, 1997a) This requires a holistic perspective on the international
plant network.
Despite the importance attached to it by both academics and practitioners, the field of
international operations management is still at a relatively early stage of theory
development (Roth, Gray, Singhal, & Singhal, 1997) and could be enriched by
insights from empirical research. (Chakravarty, Ferdows, & Singhal, 1997) In
contrast, there is a broad literature on international business, explaining basically why
multinationals exist. See for example (Dunning, 1993). There is also a rich literature
on international strategy focusing on the structure and organization of multinationals.
Examples are Bartlett and Ghoshal (1989) or Prahalad and Doz (1987). The models
and frameworks developed in these fields of research are very helpful for
manufacturing strategy research focusing on international operations. Among the
recent work that attempts to build this link between manufacturing strategy concepts
and insights from international strategy and international business, we find Ferdows
(1989; 1997b), Flaherty (1986; 1996), De Toni (1992), Shi (1995), DuBois (1993),
Meijboom and Vos (1997), Khurana and Talbot (1999).
Over the past decade, a new paradigm has emerged in the field of international
strategy that builds on the idea that the multinational company has to adopt a structure
and an organization that allows the company to respond to conflicting demands by its
6environment. (Bartlett et al., 1989; Prahalad et al., 1987) The new paradigm pays a lot
of attention to the individual manager, which was less the case in the traditional MNE
studies. The interaction and communication between managers, the power and skill
level of managers, the importance of learning and of sharing know-how are therefore
concepts that have received attention in recent research. An important element of this
new paradigm is its network approach to the study of the activities of the
multinational. (Dunning, 1993) As a consequence, research on the structure and
organization of the multinational company has shifted from a focus on the one-to-one
headquarters-subsidiaries relationships towards the problem of managing a network of
foreign subsidiaries. (Kogut, 1989).
The trend towards depicting the multinational as a network of different units can also
be observed in the manufacturing strategy literature. Flaherty for example reports
how some US companies have evolved from a manufacturing configuration of plants,
located in different countries, that were managed fairly independently of each other,
towards a coordinated manufacturing network that allowed to benefit from the
synergy among the plants. (Flaherty, 1986) She argues that the coordination of
international operations in networks can improve cost and delivery performance, and
enhances the learning from the experiences of partners in the network. (Flaherty,
1996) The idea of the international manufacturing network is also present in the work
of Ferdows, who introduced the concept of the “lead plant”, a plant contributing to the
company’s strategy by developing manufacturing capabilities and sharing these
capabilities with other plants in the network. (Ferdows, 1989)
7The strategic role of subsidiaries and plants
The international strategy literature provides several taxonomies describing the
strategic role of subsidiaries in multinationals. Bartlett and Ghoshal propose a model
that distinguishes between four generic strategic roles of subsidiaries of the MNE: the
implementer, the black hole, the contributor and the strategic leader. (Bartlett et al.,
1989, p101-103). The generic roles differ on two dimensions: the competence present
in the subsidiary (in technology, production, marketing, or another area), and the
importance to the company’s global strategy of the national environment in which the
subsidiary operates. The strategic role of the subsidiary with a global mandate as
discussed by Roth and Morrison (1992) can to some extent be compared to the
strategic leader. Somewhat different is the model proposed by Jarillo and Martinez.
(Jarillo & Martinez, 1990) The first dimension, which they have labeled "the degree
of localization", describes the extent to which activities such as R&D, purchasing,
manufacturing and marketing are performed in the subsidiary's country. This
dimension is thus comparable to the competence dimension studied by Bartlett and
Ghoshal. The models differ however on the second dimension. Whereas in the Bartlett
and Ghoshal classification the second dimension is externally oriented, in the Jarillo
and Martinez classification it is internally oriented. That is, they distinguish on the
basis of the degree of integration. This dimension ranges from very autonomous to
highly integrated with headquarters. On the basis of these two dimensions, Jarillo and
Martinez identify receptive, active and autonomous subsidiaries. Recent research has
added a fourth type of subsidiary to this classification, namely the quiescent
subsidiary. (Taggart, 1998)
These models provide rich insights into the distinct strategic roles subsidiaries may
play in the multinational. However, by taking the subsidiary as the unit of analysis,
8these models encompass the entire value chain. Since the focus of our research is
limited to manufacturing, a model describing the strategic role of the manufacturing
units, the plants, is more appropriate. Ferdows' model can be regarded as such a
translation of the strategic classifications of subsidiaries into a manufacturing
classification of plants. (Ferdows, 1989) His model compares to the Bartlett and
Ghoshal model in the sense that it distinguishes plants on the basis of the level of
competence in the plant and the location advantage, which is an element of the
environment in which the plant operates.
Ferdows defines location advantage as "the strategic reason for establishing and
exploiting the plant. He identifies three classes:
1. Access to low cost production input factors
Exploitation of low cost labor is the most important reason in this respect,
followed by the proximity to cheap raw materials and cheap energy. The fourth
production input factor, capital, is - according to Ferdows - only of minor
importance in the decision to locate manufacturing abroad.
2. Proximity to market
The exploitation of a plant in a foreign nation allows more rapid and more reliable
product delivery, and facilitates the customization of the product according to
customer requirements. Reducing financial and trade risks, and avoiding trade
barriers are - according to Ferdows - other reasons that can be classified as
“market-driven”.
3. Use of local technological resources
Proximity to universities, research centers, or sophisticated suppliers, customers
and competitors, allows the company to tap into local technological know-how.
9In his recent publications, Ferdows extends this category, by adding access to
skilled employees.  (Ferdows, 1993; Ferdows, 1997b) In other words,
technological resources are not only defined as being available from outside
sources, such as research institutes or partners in the supply chain. Ferdows
recognizes here that the skills and capabilities of the employees are an important
source of technological transfer in the manufacturing network.
Ferdows mentions two more reasons for exploiting a plant abroad (the control and
amortization of technological assets, and pre-emption of competition), but he reports
that these factors are less prevalent than the first three factors, and therefore he does
not take them into account in his model.
The plant’s competence is the second dimension in Ferdows’ model. In his earlier
work this dimension was described as the extent of technical activities carried out at
the site (Ferdows, 1989). In his more recent work it is defined as the extent to which
the following competencies are present in the plant: production, process technical
maintenance, procurement, local logistics, production planning, product and process
development and improvement, development of suppliers, the supply of global
markets, and a global hub role for product and process knowledge. (Ferdows, 1997b)
The model is shown in FIGURE 1. Ferdows has identified six types of plants, which
he labeled the “off-shore”, “source”, “server”, “contributor”, “outpost” and “lead”
plant. We refer to Ferdows (1989) for a discussion of these types of plants. The
outpost factory, which has as its primary role to collect information, is probably -
according to Ferdows - only a theoretical possibility. It is indeed unlikely that a plant
would be located in an area rich of know-how, would act as a “window” to access this
know-how, and would not exploit this know-how for its own and other plants’ benefit.
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Insert FIGURE 1 about here
Ferdows makes interesting assertions on the evolution in strategic role that can or
should be expected. 
Often - according to Ferdows - plants abroad start as off-shore plants or servers. But
over the years, if these plants stay in their original (low level) role, which implies that
there will be relatively little local competence, the plant may fall behind in
productivity as there are few manufacturing managers capable of maintaining a high
rate of improvement. Secondly, those plants contribute very little to the company as a
whole, or otherwise stated, the company as a whole might be missing an opportunity
to benefit from local expertise and market know-how. And thirdly, by treating the
plant merely as a supplier of products, the company certainly does not create a
challenging environment for the local management team. In the long run, this may de-
motivate the local managers, and at the same time make it more difficult to convince
talented people to join the plant. This places the plant in a vulnerable position. These
observations explain why it is desirable for a company to invest in its plants'
competence, in order to allow the plants to fulfill a more substantial strategic role. But
even without an explicit top-down decision to develop local competence, some plants
seem to follow a natural way upwards in the model. The pressure to reduce time-to-
market or to increase customer service for example may stimulate local management
to develop the local competence base. Similarly, one may argue that managers will
spontaneously seek for the control of a growing amount of competencies and assets,
as this improves their status and prestige within the company, and at the same time
reduces the vulnerability of the plant.
Other, usually less successful plants may disappear from the “map”, as the company
closes down the plant or sells it to another company. Reasons for this can be the
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competitive pressure to reduce costs, which may call for a concentration of the
production volume in a smaller number of plants, or the appearance of new
opportunities. (De Meyer & Vereecke, 1996)
Comments on Ferdows’ model
Ferdows’ model offers an interesting perspective on the international plant
configuration. Firstly, the classification of plants has strong face validity. It is very
recognizable for executives and is a useful framework for “mapping”, analyzing and
evaluating the plant configuration. Such a “map” may eventually show unbalances in
the set of plants and may highlight opportunities for further development of plants.
Another interesting aspect of the model is its dynamic nature. The work of other
researchers confirms that the plant’s strategic role is a dynamic concept changing over
time, and that evolutions in the company’s environment may accelerate such a
change. See for example Plasschaert and Van Den Bulcke (1991).
On the other hand, some concerns can be formulated on this model. The location
advantages are a selection of three categories, out of the five expressed by Ferdows.
The selection of the categories has not been empirically verified, except for some
descriptive cases. Moreover, the aspect of “control over technological assets” is of
another dimension than the other factors mentioned. Whereas the other factors may
indeed be the primary driver to establish a foreign plant, the desire to control
technological assets rather determines the choice between partnership or ownership,
which is a decision that is subordinate to the decision to go abroad.
A second concern deals with the vertical axis of Ferdows' model. As we have
described Ferdows has provided two slightly different definitions of this dimension,
namely the extent to which technical activities are performed in the plant, and the
12
presence of competencies in the plant. In his description of the six roles, Ferdows uses
a construct that expresses the importance of the plant for the company’s strategy: The
roles evolve from “just supplying products”, over “being a focal point for the
company”, to “a plant that other plants depend upon”. This implicit construct is -in
our opinion- a more direct expression of the strategic role of the plant. An empirical
test of the model requires a clear definition and operationalization of this dimension.
A related concern is that the model suggests that there is some hierarchy or rank order
in the competencies in a plant. However, in reality, it is possible for example to give a
certain plant the responsibility for product development without decentralizing
procurement or logistics.
In what follows we propose a slightly modified model that deals with the above
concerns, and we suggest a way to operationalize the model.
RESEARCH METHODOLOGY
The research reported in this paper is part of a larger research study on the
international plant configuration of multinational companies. Since the purpose of the
research was to understand the “how” and “why” of the international plant network,
case study research has been preferred over other research methodologies. (Yin, 1984)
Great care has been taken to avoid the pitfalls of case research. A common argument
against the use of case research stems from the misconception that case research
would be based on qualitative data only, and would therefore lack precision and rigor.
However, several methodological papers and books are available that help the
researcher to design a rigorous, precise and objective research instrument. Examples
13
are Eisenhardt (1989), Miles (1994) and Yin (1984). To the extent possible and where
appropriate, these methodological guidelines have been followed in our research.
Without being exhaustive, we mention that a strict research protocol has been
designed, a questionnaire with both closed and open ended questions has been
developed as guidance for the interviews, and both qualitative and quantitative data
have been collected in a rigorous and structured way and have been analyzed in a
systematic way.  It is also important to note that in order to enhance construct validity
multiple raters have been used. This tactic is still fairly uncommon in manufacturing
strategy research; Speier and Swink have highlighted this as one of the shortcomings
in current operations management research. They argue that research based on a
single respondent may be subject to the “lone wolf syndrome”, the risk that this single
respondent has a biased view on the organization unit being studied, or has limited
access to information. (Boyer & Verma, 1996; Speier & Swink, 1995)  The reliability
of the data obtained from the multiple raters can be assessed through the “Intra-Class
Correlation” or ICC method. The ICC index measures the variance of the scores of the
raters within a plant or company, relative to the between-plant or between-company
variance.
The case research has been carried out in eight manufacturing companies
headquartered in Western Europe, in different industries: food products (2
companies), textile goods, plastic products, leather products, primary metal, fabricated
metal and electrical goods. The companies had between 4 and 10 manufacturing
plants.  The primary selection criterion for the cases has been diversity, at the level of
the company as well as the plant. At the company level it is important to have
diversity in terms of the international environment in which the company operates,
since one of the research objectives was to explore the link between the characteristics
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of the company’s international environment and the plant configuration in the
company. That is, the cases had to be distributed over the global, transnational and
multinational environments, as described by Bartlett and Ghoshal (1989). Diversity at
the plant level has been obtained by selecting companies with a minimum of 4 plants,
spread over a broad geographical region. The rationale being that with three plants or
less, companies have few opportunities for differentiating the role and focus of their
plants. A geographical spread of the plants (Pan-European, or even global) was
expected to result in a broad range of drivers for establishing the plant, and therefore
also in a broad range of plant roles. 
Secondly, the sample was limited to companies with their headquarters in Western
Europe, to avoid major cultural differences between the distinct cases.
Data has been gathered at two levels of analysis: the plant and the company.
− Interviews have been conducted with the general manager and with manufacturing
managers at headquarters. In total data has been collected on 59 manufacturing
plants, through 37 interviews (with a total duration of appr. 120 hours). The
number of interviews varied between 2 and 6 per case. A highly structured
questionnaire with closed and open-ended questions has been used as a guide
through the interviews.  The purpose of these interviews has been to measure the
strategic role of each of the plants as well as its evolution, as the managers in
headquarters perceive it.
− A (different) questionnaire has been sent to the plant managers and/or the
manufacturing managers in the distinct production plants. The purpose of these
questionnaires has been to measure the strategic role of the plant as well as its
evolution, as the managers in the plant perceive it. A total of 144 questionnaires
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have been sent to 54 out of the 59 plants1. 83% of the questionnaires have been
returned, from 50 plants. This implies that in total we have received data from the
plant managers on 50 out of the 59 plants (85%). The number of questionnaires
returned from the plants varied between 1 and 5 per plant.
Fourty-five plants are located in Europe. The other 15 plants are located in the Far and
Middle East, the USA and Canada, South Africa and Australia. The number of years
the plant had been part of the company ranges between 0 and 50 years, with an
average of 17 years. The number of employees in the plants ranges between 77 and
1.100, with an average of 340.
Operationalization of the constructs
The vertical axis: the level of strategic role of the plant. The operationalization of the
vertical axis of Ferdows' model can be done in multiple ways. The extent to which
technical activities are performed at the plant (which is the definition of the vertical
dimension Ferdows used in his first publication in 1989) is one possibility; the
number of staff people in the plant can serve as a proxy for this variable. The level of
competence at the plant (which is the definition of the vertical dimension Ferdows
used in his publication in 1997) is another possibility. However, these possible
operationalizations offer indirect measures of the construct, since they imply
assumptions on the degree of autonomy, the absence of slack resources and the
diffusion of know-how in the plant network. As argued earlier, Ferdows' description
of the six different strategic roles brings forward a construct that expresses the extent
to which the plant contributes to the competitive strategy of the company. The roles
evolve from “just supplying products”, over “being a focal point for the company”, to
                                                          
1 For five of the plants, headquarters asked us not to send a questionnaire to the plant managers.
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“a plant that other plants depend upon”. We have developed a Likert-scale to measure
this construct directly. Descriptions have been attached to the scale, in order to guide
the choice of a score for the plants. These descriptions were extracted from the
typology description that was given by Ferdows. They are listed in TABLE 1. It is
important to note that the strategic role, defined in this way, is a matter of degree,
rather than a typology. We will therefore, in our empirical discussion, analyze the
level of strategic role played by the plant, rather than the type of strategic role.
Insert TABLE 1 about here
We have asked managers at headquarters, during the in-depth interviews, to rate all
plants on a 1-to-9 scale. The current strategic role of the plants at the moment of the
interview has been measured (variable “ROLE today”), as well as the level of
strategic role of the plant five years before (variable “ROLE -5y”) and the expected
level five years ahead (variable “ROLE +5y”). The same question has been asked to
plant management for their particular plant, through a mail questionnaire.  The
questionnaire item is reproduced in APPENDIX A. The level of strategic role of the
plant has been determined as the average score that has been given for that plant by
the respondents.
Since this data is highly perceptual tests have been carried out to guarantee the
construct validity of the measure. As explained earlier, Ferdows suggested to use the
number of people in technical activities as a proxy for the level of strategic role
played by the plant. Comparing the level of strategic role with the number of people
in the manufacturing staff in the plant could therefore provide an estimate of the
construct validity of our measure. The Pearson correlation between our measure of the
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strategic role as perceived in headquarters and the number of manufacturing staff2
people in the plant is 0,55. Comparing to the level of strategic role as perceived by the
plant managers gives an R² of 0,40 (both significantly different from 0 at p<5%) The
correlation is indeed fairly high, thus strengthening our confidence in the measures. 
Although we don't expect a perfect fit between the perception of the strategic role by
the headquarters and the plant managers, there should be some correspondence. The
correlation between these 2 measures was 0,62 (significantly different from 0 at
p<5%).
The reliability of the measure is evaluated through the ICC-index. TABLE 2 shows
the inter-rater reliability of the three variables, measured at headquarters and at plant
level. The ICC exceeds the cut-off rule of 0,70 recommended by Futrell for all three
variables. Consequently, a fortiori, the ICC satisfies the 0,60 cut-off point
recommended by Boyer. (Boyer & Verma, 2000; Futrell, 1995)
Insert TABLE 2 about here
The horizontal axis: Primary drivers for establishing and exploiting a plant. The
horizontal axis of Ferdows’ model describes the primary driver for establishing or
acquiring the plant. This ties in with the vast literature on location selection. Several
authors have described the location selection as a multi-stage problem, in which each
stage involves another kind of decisions. Among these authors we find Schmenner
(1979; 1982), Dunning (1993), Haigh (1990), and MacCormack et al (1994). 
                                                          
2 Manufacturing staff comprises planning and inventory management, purchasing, product and process
design & development, maintenance and quality control & quality management.
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We should note that there is no uniform definition of these stages. Also, the stages are
not always strictly sequential. Yet, the following set of stages seems to emerge:
− First, there is the decision to produce abroad. This is a strategic decision that may
be triggered by the observation that a capacity expansion is necessary, that labor
cost advantages may be gained by producing in foreign countries, or that market
opportunities are present. (Ernst & Young, 1992; Haigh, 1990; Schmenner, 1979)
The major question that needs to be answered by top management is how the
foreign plant will fit in the existing plant network, and how the plant will
contribute to the company’s strategy.
− The next decision concerns the region or country in which the new facility will be
located. Tools are available that are helpful in screening different countries or
areas. An example of such a tool is provided in Leontiades (1985)
Often this decision is linked to the first decision. For example, if a new market
opportunity is the driver for the foreign plant, the selection of the region is
dictated by this market location. Research has also shown that managers often
have a preference for some region, before the evaluation of regions has even been
started. (Haigh, 1990; Hood & Truijens, 1993)
− A third stage involves the site selection. Important factors in this decision are for
example the cost of land, the access to roads and ports, the quality of the schools.
(Schmenner, Huber, & Cook, 1987)
The focus of our research has been primarily on the decision to establish (or acquire) a
production unit, rather than the criteria for country or site selection. We have
composed a list of potential drivers for the establishment of a plant on the basis of
some theoretical and empirical publications of location studies, most of which have in
turn been based on extensive literature reviews. (Artikis, 1991; Badri, Davis, & Davis,
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1995; Dunning, 1993; Ferdows, 1993; Porter, 1990) We also allowed the interviewees
to add items to the list if they thought some important drivers were missing. The
resulting list is provided in APPENDIX B. The drivers have been grouped into 9
categories, according to their theoretical coherence. The interviewees were asked to
select a maximum of three drivers explaining the initial reason for
establishing/acquiring the plant, as well as a maximum of three major advantages the
plant’s location provides today.
Subsequently, for each of the plants, a summary was made of all the drivers that had
been mentioned by the interviewees. We then went back to one of our interviewees in
each of the cases, and asked him to select the primary driver among the drivers that
had been mentioned by himself and his colleagues. This procedure of asking multiple
respondents to indicate the three main drivers, summarizing the responses, and
discussing the results with one of the respondents, has ensured the reliability of the
measure.  TABLE 3 shows the number of times each of the drivers has been ranked as
the most important driver for establishing the plant initially, and for exploiting the
plant today.
Insert TABLE 3 about here
It is clear from TABLE 3 that the primary drivers for the initial decision to establish
or acquire a plant are diverse. In total 15 drivers have been indicated as primary initial
driver, taken from six of the categories listed in the appendix. On the other hand, only
8 drivers have been indicated as the primary advantage of exploiting the plant today.
These 8 drivers are taken from three categories only: availability of labor, availability
of skills & know-how and proximity to the market. This observation suggests that
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when assessing an existing plant configuration, managers take into account a smaller
number of factors than when thinking about an enlargement of the plant configuration.
Secondly, it suggests that, although there is a diversity of reasons for
establishing/acquiring a plant, some of these reasons tend to fade over time. This
becomes clear when we group the drivers mentioned in TABLE 3 into the theoretical
categories. The evolution between the initial primary driver and today’s primary
driver is shown in  FIGURE 2
Insert FIGURE 2 about here
The figure shows that market proximity is by far the most stable location driver.
Almost all the plants that have been established in order to be close to a market, still
have their market proximity as their main advantage. 
Labor and skills appear to be less stable location drivers. For some plants (6 out of
11), it is still the major advantage, but other plants seem to have found other
advantages that replaced the labor advantage.
The socio-political drivers appear to be highly unstable. None of the plants in our
sample that have been established for socio-political reasons, have these socio-
political reasons still as the major advantage today. The most unstable location
drivers are those drivers that have a “once-only” character. Tax breaks or financial
incentives are typically provided at the moment of the acquisition, or on a temporary
basis. These drivers therefore influence the initial decision, but don’t provide a lasting
major advantage. Overcoming trade barriers has been an important driver for the
establishment/acquisition of plants: It has been mentioned as the primary initial driver
for six plants in total. As of today, it is not mentioned as the primary advantage of
exploiting any of the plants, which can be explained by the decline in tariffs as a
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consequence of agreements such as the European unification and NAFTA. 
The same remark holds for the acquisition of plants in order to prevent competition
from acquiring the plant or in order to capture the market supplied by the plant. Once
the plant is part of the network, the threat of competition entering the market has
diminished. As soon as the customer base of the plant is internalized, the company
may probably consider supplying these customers from one of its other plants, if this
proves more appropriate for cost or other reasons. The one-to-one relationship plant-
customer thus becomes more vague.
THE MODEL OF FERDOWS: EMPIRICAL VERIFICATION
We can now compare the conceptual model developed by Ferdows, with the empirical
results obtained in our case research. The scatterplot in FIGURE 3 reflects the
position of the 59 plants in our sample in Ferdows’ model. The empirical results
support the model proposed by Ferdows in some aspects, and modify it in others.
Insert FIGURE 3 about here
Conclusion 1
Ferdows recognized that there is diversity in the drivers for establishing and
exploiting a plant; he distinguished five categories of drivers. However, he claimed
that the three categories represented in his model (low-cost production factors, skills
& technological know-how and market proximity) encompass the vast majority of
plants. (Ferdows, 1989) This is confirmed in our research TABLE 3 shows that we
observed no plants for which today’s primary advantage of exploiting it fell outside
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these three categories. Moreover, Ferdows claims that among the low-cost production
factors labor is the most important factor. This is confirmed in our research.
Conclusion 2
We did, however, observe four plants for which the respondents failed to identify a
clear advantage of exploiting them. The only reason why these plants are still
exploited is the cost (the financial and social cost) of closing the plant.
Conclusion 3
Ferdows’ model implies that the degree of contribution of the plant to the company’s
network differs according to the primary reason for exploiting the plant. It is
suggested graphically that plants with low-cost production as the primary driver tend
to play a lower level strategic role than plants with market proximity as the primary
driver. If we exclude the theoretical outpost factories from the chart, we see that there
is also the implicit suggestion that plants with skills and know-how as the primary
driver play a higher level strategic role than plants with market proximity as the
primary driver. (See FIGURE 1)
The median and mean level of strategic role follows indeed the hypothesized pattern.
(See TABLE 4)
Insert TABLE 4 about here
The non-parametric Mann-Whitney U Test shows that the plants which have market
proximity or access to skills and know-how as the primary driver for their exploitation
do indeed have in general a significantly higher level strategic role than plants which
have low-cost labor as the primary driver (p<5%). The difference in strategic role
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between plants with skills and know-how as primary driver, and plants with market
proximity as primary driver is not significant. The four plants for which no clear
location advantage could be identified have a strategic role that is significantly lower
than the role of plants which have a market (p<10%) or skills and know-how
advantage (p<5%).
Conclusion 4
Closely related to this is the hypothesis that there are no plants in the upper left and
right hand corner of Ferdows’ model. That is, the plants with the highest level of
strategic role are by definition plants that have skills and/or know-how as their
primary advantage. At least, this is suggested by the graph in FIGURE 1. 
Our data contradicts this hypothesis. One of the plants with a high-level strategic role
falls in the labor category for its primary driver. Twelve plants have a high level
strategic role and have market proximity as the primary driver. We conclude that there
is evidence of plants which do not have skills or know-how as their primary driver,
and yet are regarded as centers of excellence that play a strategically important role in
the company’s plant configuration.
Conclusion 5
The hypothesis of an upward evolution of plants in the framework is supported by the
data. The (non-parametric) Wilcoxon Matched Pairs Test indicates that there has
indeed been a significant increase in the median strategic role in the five years prior to
the research study (significance level p <1%). However, the increase was not expected
to continue in the 5 years following the research study.
We should note that this test reflects the evolution in strategic role only for the
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subsample of plants that had been part of the network for at least five years (N=49).
We will refer to this group of plants as the “senior plants”. Comparing these "senior
plants" to the "newcomers", the plants that had joined the company recently (that is, in
the five years prior to the study) adds extra insights. The average level of strategic
role of these “newcomers” is 2,83 which is lower than the average level of strategic
role of the “senior plants” (avg. strategic role 4,97). The (non-parametric) Mann-
Whitney U Test comparing these two independent groups of plants indicates that the
difference in strategic role between the “seniors” and the “newcomers” is significant
at the 5% level.
We conclude from the statistical analyses that the plants that have been with the
company for at least five years have experienced, on average, a moderate but
significant increase in strategic role. Newcomers have a low level of strategic role,
compared to the “seniors” in the plant configurations.
Conclusion 6
Ferdows describes that some plants combine two or more roles. (Ferdows, 1997b) He
gives the example of a plant that is a server for a specific region, and at the same time
an offshore supplier of specific components. Although our data has not been designed
to test this statement, it provides some evidence for such “secondary roles". For 53 of
the 59 plants, more than one location driver was mentioned as being important. Up to
eight drivers have been mentioned for one plant.
Conclusion 7
FIGURE 4 contrasts the perception of the managers at headquarters with the
perception of the managers in the plants, by comparing the level of strategic role of
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the plants as measured in the interviews at headquarters, with the level of strategic
role reported in the plant questionnaires. We recall here that plant perception data
stems from the 120 questionnaires returned from 50 plants.
Insert FIGURE 4 about here
Some observations can be made from FIGURE 4:
− The management teams in about half of the plants have a very good notion of the
level of strategic role played by their plant. For 50% of the plants, the plant
respondents classified the plant in the same category (low, medium or high) as did
the headquarters interviewees.
− A small group of plants (10%) overestimates its level of strategic role: 5 of the
plants have been classified higher by the plant respondents than by the
headquarters interviewees. However, no plants have been observed in the lower
right hand class, which would be the class of plants that strongly overestimate the
level of strategic role they play in the company.
− A fairly large group of plants underestimates the level of strategic role they play in
the company: 39% of the plants have been classified lower by the plant
respondents than by the headquarters managers. For 10% of the plants, the gap
between headquarters and plants perception was even 2 categories. These are the
plants in the upper left-hand cell in FIGURE 4.
When comparing the performance of the plants, we come to an intriguing result: The
plants in the upper left hand corner, that is those plants that strongly underestimate
their strategic role, on average, outperform their cost and quality performance target
more than the other plants in the sample. The explanation may be that, because these
plants perform remarkably better on cost and quality than targeted, the managers at
headquarters have raised their expectations in terms of the level of contribution that
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the plants might deliver to the company. Plant management, on the contrary, is not
(yet) aware of the plant’s capabilities to act as a network player contributing to the
other plants, and therefore underestimates the strategic role played by the plant.
We conclude that the overall picture that emerges from FIGURE 4 is thus a picture of
“modesty” of plant management. Very few managers overestimate the level of
strategic role played by their plant. Rather, many underestimate the level of strategic
role played by the plant. Especially those whose performance exceeds (more than for
the average plant) the cost/quality target set for them still have a modest perception of
the level of strategic role they play in the company.
LIMITATIONS AND FUTURE RESEARCH
As mentioned in the Methodology section, this paper is based on case research. While
one of the major advantages of case research is the depth of the information that can
be collected, its major disadvantage is the limitation in external validity. The extent to
which the conclusions can be generalized may be questioned. However, we are
convinced that the careful selection of the cases from a diversity of industries
improves the external validity of the work.
As explained earlier, the cases have been limited to companies headquartered in
Western Europe, to avoid cultural differences between the cases. Whether the
conclusions still hold in multinationals headquartered in other continents is
unexplored, and can be subject to future research.
Our research describes the strategic role played by plants in international plant
networks. It identifies those plants that develop know-how and capabilities, and
transfer this know-how to the other plants in the network. The research doesn't explain
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how this know-how is developed, nor does it describe the mechanisms used for the
diffusion of this know-how and their effectiveness. This is also an area of future
research.
Finally, the model has been developed for manufacturing sectors and the implicit
assumption is that the production can be separated from the distribution of the
products. Therefore the model appears to be valid in the manufacturing industries
only. However, service firms are becoming more and more international and as we
pointed out elsewhere are confronted much earlier with setting up an international
network of operating units. (Van Looy, Van Dierdonck, & Gemmel, 1998) The issue
of the strategic role these operating units play in the network is an important one. For
service firms the primary reason for establishing a unit is overwhelmingly market
proximity. Although we have not done explicit research, it is our belief that some sites
might play a different strategic role. This can be explained by referring to the concept
of the service triangle. (Van Looy et al., 1998) Service organizations that are
classified at the top of the triangle (as McDonald's and Wal-Mart) will probably have
one outspoken headquarters unit with the other sites typically in the position of a
server plant. In service organizations at the bottom of the triangle, more specifically at
the right hand side (e.g. professional service firms like consulting), we expect to find a
more balanced situation with various units having a higher level strategic role, i.e.
contributors and lead plants. However, companies within the same sector may follow
a different strategy. For instance Toys 'R' Us, which is a distribution company as is
Wal-Mart, is much more sensitive to local needs. Therefore we expect a higher level
strategic role of the units at Toys 'R' Us than for instance at Wal-Mart Operating units
at Toys 'R' Us are definitely at a higher position in the model than the server plants.
28
Moreover, by splitting front office and back office activities, companies find
opportunities for improving productivity by locating the back office in low-cost labor
countries, thus adding off-shore units to their network. In some case, the technological
evolution reduces the need for market proximity, even for the front office. The
location of call centers in low-cost labor countries illustrates this point. However, this
anecdotal evidence linking service companies to Ferdows' model should be subject to
further research.
CONCLUSION
In this paper, we have discussed the international manufacturing model proposed by
Ferdows. The paper suggests a tool for operationalizing the model, and tests the
model empirically on a sample of plants spread globally. We conclude that the
empirical data supports Ferdows’ model in most of its elements. However, the
typology appears to be too limited to encompass the strategic role that was initially,
that is at the moment of establishing or acquiring the plant, played by the plant. This
suggests that, although the model provides a useful tool for describing and assessing
the strategic role played by the plants in today’s manufacturing networks, it doesn’t
provide enough variety to describe the plants that may be added to the network. 
Another remarkable difference between the model and the empirical data is the
presence of centers of excellence with market proximity, rather than the proximity of
skills or know-how as their primary advantage. 
Finally, the research shows the modesty of plant management. Very few managers
have overestimated the level of strategic role played by their plant; on the contrary,
many managers have underestimated the level of strategic role played by their plant.
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This was especially the case in plants performing better than the target set for them.
This suggests that the evolution in the strategic role of the plant is a combination of






























Description of distinct levels of strategic role
low level strategic
role
1 The main goal of the plant is "to get the products
produced". Managerial investment in the plant is
focused on running the plant efficiently.
3 The plant has sufficient internal capabilities to develop
and improve its own components, products and
production processes
5 The plant is a focal point in the company for the
development of specific important components,
products or production processes




9 The plant is a "center of excellence", and serves as a
partner of headquarters in building strategic capabilities
in the manufacturing function
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TABLE 2




p-level ICC p-level ICC
ROLE today *** p<.001 0,82 *** p<.001 0,82
ROLE -5y *** p<.001 0,85 *** p<.001 0,80
ROLE +5y *** p<.001 0,83 *** p<.001 0,70
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TABLE 3
Primary reasons for establishing/exploiting the plant








rapid/reliable delivery to customers MAR 17 24
adapt products to local taste/cooperation with customers MAR 12 15
overcome trade barriers SO-POL 6
take advantage of low-cost labor LAB 5 9
the place of residence of the owner OTH 5
capture/maintain market share COMP 4
tax breaks and/or investment incentives SO-POL 3
fast service or technical support to customers MAR 3 7
availability of workers SKILL 3
highly qualified workers SKILL 2 6
seize a provided opportunity OTH 2
skilled engineers SKILL 1 2
close to source of technological know-how SKILL 1 1
prevent major competitors COMP 1
close to major competitors COMP 1
managerial/organizational skills SKILL 2
                                                          
3 In total, 66 primary drivers have been indicated. This is more then the number of plants (59), since for




























































Empirical verification of the plant typology based on Ferdows’ model
























labor skill knowhow market none
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TABLE 4
Descriptive statistics of strategic role (classified according to primary driver)
primary driver Valid N  Mean Median
market 38 4,86 4,60
labor 9 3,04 1,67
skills & know-how 8 6,08 6,50
none 4 2,80 2,17
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FIGURE 4
HQ vs plant perception of the strategic role of the plant


































1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
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APPENDIX A Level of strategic role
Questionnaire item for interviews in headquarters
Typically, the plants in a company may have different roles.  Some plants, for
example, have a clear focus on the production function only; other plants may be the
development and production center for specific product groups or components, or
may be the specialized plant for specific processes; other plants have become a
partner of headquarters for certain manufacturing capabilities that are important for
the whole company.
This "role" of the plants is described below on a 1 to 9 scale. On this scale,  indicate
for each of the plants what role it plays in your company today.
Be careful to describe in this scale what the plant actually does in your company,





















































plant 1 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
plant 2 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
….. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
What changes do you expect in the near future (coming 5 years) ? Indicate in the
previous table where each of the plants should be positioned, according to you, 5
years from now.
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Some of the plants may have had the same strategic role ever since the plant became
part of your company.  Other plants however, may have evolved over time, in terms
of their strategic roles. For these plants, please describe in the following table what
their strategic role was 5 years ago.
Can you give us some typical facts about each of the plants, that you thought of while
you were filling in the previous table ?
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APPENDIX B Potential drivers for establishing/exploiting a plant
Questionnaire item for interviews in headquarters
In the following list, some reasons for establishing manufacturing facilities have been
identified.
Please indicate, for each plant, which reasons are critical in explaining why the plant
has become part of your company. Choose maximum 3 reasons. 
Similarly, we ask you to identify the (maximum) three main advantages that the
plant's location provides today.
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Proximity to suppliers
• to benefit from rapid/reliable delivery from suppliers and/or low transport costs
• to be close to low cost suppliers
• to facilitate cooperation with suppliers in product design, planning, etc.
• to have access to source of raw materials
Availability of labor
• to take advantage of low-cost labor
• to take advantage of the availability of workers
• to take advantage of favorable social climate (high productivity, low absenteeism rate, weak
unionization, etc.)
Availability of skills and know-how
• to take advantage of highly qualified workers
• to take advantage of skilled engineers
• to take advantage of managerial/organizational skills
• to be close to the source of technological know-how (university, research institute, etc.)
Proximity to market
• to provide rapid/reliable delivery to customers, at low transport costs
• to adapt products to local taste and/or to facilitate co-operation with customers in product design,
planning, etc.
• to provide fast service or technical support to customers
Socio-Political
• to benefit from tax breaks and/or investment incentives
• to overcome trade barriers
• to benefit from favorable or less stringent environmental regulations
• to reduce the impact of exchange rate fluctuations
Competition
• to be close to major competitors
• to prevent major competitors from establishing a manufacturing facility in the area
• to capture/maintain market share
Energy
• to take advantage of low-cost energy
Other
• to take advantage of highly qualitative environment (air, water, noise, climate)
• to create a high quality of life for employees
• the place of residence of the owner
• to seize a provided opportunity
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